

UDC: 93.94

DOI:10.52971/18294316-2023.26.1-153

## PECULIARITIES OF THE US POLICY OF “DEMOCRACY PROMOTION” UNDER GEORGE W. BUSH

*Astghik S. Hayrapetyan*

Deputy Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister's Staff, Yerevan, RA

### Abstract

**Introduction:** After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched a global campaign against terrorism characterized by nation-building beyond its borders through "hard power" and an attempt was taken to reshape the regional order through democracy promotion. **Methods and materials:** To present the prerequisites and implementation features of democracy promotion as a pillar of the US regional policy under George W. Bush, comparisons are made between the Middle East policies conducted by the US presidential administrations during and after the Cold War. **Analysis:** As a result of the comparative analysis, the attention was particularly focused on the proportion of the component "democracy implementation or promotion". **Results:** The analysis of the latter, as well as the study of the "democracy promotion" policy, carried out by the administration of George W. Bush and the transformational diplomacy in its context, allows us to reveal the attempt to re-explain and reinterpret the domino theory, put forward during the Cold War, that became the conceptual basis of this foreign policy direction in the unipolar world order and proved to be a failure in the aftermath.

**Key words:** USA, George W. Bush, war on terror, democracy, nation building, Iraq, al-Qaeda, Middle East, domino theory, transformational diplomacy.

**Citation:** Hayrapetyan A. Peculiarities of the US Policy of “Democracy Promotion” under George W. Bush, // "Scientific works" of SCAS NAS RA. Gyumri, 2023. V. 1(26). 153-164 pp..

DOI:10.52971/18294316-2023.26.1-153

«ԺՈՂՈՎՐԴԱՎԱՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԽԹԱՆՄԱՆ» ԱՄՆ-Ի ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ  
ԱՌԱՆՁՆԱՀԱՏԿՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ ԶՈՐՋ ԲՈՒՇ ԿՐՏՍԵՐԻ ՕՐՈՔ

*Աստղիկ Ս. Հայրապետյան*

ՀՀ վարչապետի աշխատակազմ, փոխվարչապետի գրասենյակ, Երևան

**Անփոփում**

*Նախաբան.* 2001 թվականի սեպտեմբերի 11-ի ահաբեկչությունից հետո ԱՄՆ-ը նախաձեռնեց ահաբեկչության դեմ համաշխարհային արշավ, որին բնորոշ էր «կոշտ ուժի» կիրառմամբ սեփական սահմաններից դուրս ազգաշինությունը, ինչպես նաև տարածաշրջանային կարգի վերաձևակերպման փորձը՝ ժողովրդավարության ներդրմամբ և խթանմամբ: *Մեթոդներ և նյութեր.* Ներկայացնելու համար Ջորջ Բուշ կրտսերի օրոք ժողովրդավարության խթանման՝ որպես ԱՄՆ-ի տարածաշրջանային քաղաքականության հիմնասյունի ձևավորման նախադրյալները և իրականացման առանձնահատկությունները, համեմատականներ են տարվել սառըպատերազմյան և հետսառըպատերազմյան շրջանի ԱՄՆ նախագահական վարչակազմերի կողմից վարվող մերձավորարևելյան քաղաքականությունների միջև: *Վերլուծություն.* Համեմատական վերլուծության արդյունքում ուշադրությունը մասնավորապես կենտրոնացվել է «ժողովրդավարության ներդրման կամ խթանման» քաղաքականության վրա: *Արդյունքներ.* Վերջինիս վերլուծությունը, ինչպես նաև Ջ. Բուշ կրտսերի վարչակազմի կողմից իրականացվող «ժողովրդավարության խթանման» քաղաքականության և դրա համատեքստում փոխակերպական դիվանագիտության ուսումնասիրումը թույլ է տալիս բացահայտել արտաքին քաղաքականության այս ուղղության հիմքում ընկած և դեռևս Սառը պատերազմի ժամանակաշրջանում առաջ քաշված «դոմինոյի տեսությանը» նորովի դրսևորման ու վերաիմաստավորման փորձը միաբերեռ աշխարհակարգում և դրա ձախողումը:

**Բանալի բառեր՝** *ԱՄՆ, Ջորջ Բուշ, ահաբեկչության դեմ պատերազմ, ժողովրդավարություն, ազգաշինություն, Իրաք, ալ-Քաիդա, Մերձավոր Արևելք, դոմինոյի տեսություն, փոխակերպական դիվանագիտություն:*

**Ինչպես հղել՝** *Հայրապետյան Ա., «ժողովրդավարության ներդրման և խթանման» ԱՄՆ-ի քաղաքականության առանձնահատկությունները Ջորջ Բուշ կրտսերի օրոք // ՀՀ ԳԱԱ ՇՀՀ կենտրոնի «Գիտական աշխատություններ»: 2023: Հ.1(26): 153-164 էջեր:*

DOI: 10.52971/18294316-2023.26.1-153

**ОСОБЕННОСТИ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ «ПРОДВИЖЕНИЯ  
ДЕМОКРАТИИ» ПРИ ДЖОРДЖЕ БУШЕ-МЛАДШЕМ**

*Астхик С. Айрапетян*

Офис вице-премьер-министра, Аппарат Премьер-министра, Ереван, РА

**Аннотация**

*Введение:* После терактов 11 сентября 2001 г. Соединенные Штаты начали глобальную кампанию против терроризма, характеризующуюся формированием нации за пределами своих границ

с помощью «жесткой силы» и попыткой изменить региональный порядок путем продвижения демократии. *Методы и материал:* Для представления предпосылок и особенностей реализации продвижения демократии как одного из столпов региональной политики США при Джордже Буше проводится сравнение ближневосточной политики, проводимой администрациями президентов США во время и после холодной войны. *Анализ:* В результате сравнительного анализа особое внимание было обращено на долю компонента внедрения или продвижения демократии. *Результаты:* анализ политики «продвижения демократии», проводимой администрацией Джорджа Буша-младшего, и трансформационной дипломатии в ее контексте позволяет выявить попытку переобъяснить и переинтерпретировать теорию домино, выдвинутую в период Холодной войны, ставшей концептуальной основой этого внешнеполитического направления в условиях однополярного миропорядка и в последующем потерпевшая неудачу.

**Ключевые слова:** США, Джордж Буш, война с террором, демократия, национальное строительство, Ирак, Аль-Каида, Ближний Восток, теория домино, трансформационная дипломатия.

**Как цитировать:** Айрапетян А. Особенности американской политики «продвижения демократии» при Джордже Буше-младшем, // “Научные труды” ШЦАИ НАН РА. Гюмри, 2023. Т. 1(26). 153-164 сс..DOI: 10.52971/18294316-2023.26.1-153

**INTRODUCTION:** Under George W. Bush, the national security strategy documents were published in 2002 and especially in 2006 emphasized the introduction, promotion, and spread of democracy in addition to the comprehensive fight against terrorism. Since 2006, the arrow of US regional and mainly Iraqi policy priorities has shifted from using hard power to the promotion of democracy and the advancement of the Freedom Agenda. The paper covers the US presidential administrations’ regional policies and reveals the role of democracy during the Cold War and the decade following, illustrating the origins and peculiarities of promoting democracy and analyzing the approaches of the George Bush administration to the organization of the Middle East policy by presenting the change in the format of US foreign policy implementation under George W. Bush (due to the emergence of transformational diplomacy).

In this context, the author has studied and presented several US official sources and also developed specific provisions on the issue in question set out in the relevant works of American, Arab, European, Jewish, and Russian political scientists and thinkers.

#### ***Role and Significance of Democracy in the American Foreign Policy Doctrines during the Second Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century***

The study of the US regional policy allows us to consider the promotion of democracy as a strategic component of American foreign policy, which has manifested itself differently in different regions and periods.

To get an insight into the policy of promoting democracy in the Middle East, it is first necessary to have a look at the stages and regularity of the development of relations between the US and the regional states, which experienced the following periods of evolution in the 1940s-1970s:

- 1948-1960, the period when the US was trying to obtain allies against the USSR in the face of the Arab world and special relations with Israel had not yet been established;
- 1961-1967, the period of the formation of the prerequisites for a regular, more clearly "patron-client" relationship between the USA and Israel;
- 1967-1973, the beginning of the "patron-client" [13, p. 506; 7, pp. 44-45] relationship between the USA and Israel, which began to fully manifest itself after 1974 [4, pp. 233-234].

The US Congress and Jewish community, as a soft factor of influence, forced President Harry Truman as early as 1947 to support the partition of Palestine and to recognize Israel, but the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency minimized this support because it was inconsistent with US global and regional interests. Until 1960, the US focused on containing the USSR in the region while trying to build strong alliances with the Arab world.

In this context, Dwight Eisenhower's administration viewed Israel as an obstacle to US political and security interests in the Middle East, and it was during his tenure that bilateral relations experienced the most severe political crises of their existence [5, p. 84; 4, pp. 233-235]. In general, D. Eisenhower divided the world into "free" and "not free" countries exclusively defining the countries outside the sphere of influence of the USSR and countries in the zone of influence [12, pp. 237-238]. In the Middle East, the expression of "support for freedom" and or "electoral" democracy was the support given to supporters of the Shah of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran and the organization of a military coup against the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (1951-1953), who decided to nationalize the oil industry in Iran [31]. In addition to the nationalization of oil, the US was concerned that the pro-communist Iranian National Party (Hezb-e Tude-ye Iran or Tudeh), which opposed Shah's regime, might switch to M. Mossadegh's side, thus contributing to Iran's external orientation towards the USSR and strengthening the latter's positions there [20, pp. 469-470].

From the above, it can be concluded that in the early 1940s-1960s, the US was guided by the logic dictated by the Cold War in its relations with the peoples of the Middle East region, that is, to maintain and expand the sphere of influence, dividing the world into "free" and "not free" camps, and promoting and spreading popularity was not yet considered a primary component of foreign policy and a means of implementation.

In 1961-1967, the protection of democracy and human freedoms that began under Truman was given a new lease of life, and along with the supply of weapons by the USSR to Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Under John Kennedy's presidency, the prerequisites for a special "patron-client" relationship with Israel began to form in the Middle East [4, pp. 236-237; 21]<sup>1</sup>. A full-blown patron-client relationship first emerged during the 1964-1967 presidency of Lyndon Johnson. By supporting Israel, the US sought to counterbalance the rise of communism and Arab nationalism in the region. Another important reason was the continuous pressure of the US Congress to provide more tangible support to Israel, as well as the Johnson administration's quest to gain the help of the American Jewish community in the Vietnam War and the presidential elections in 1968 [5, p. 86; 4, pp. 237-238]<sup>2</sup>.

The formation of "patron-client" relations negatively affected US regional interests. Hence, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried to act more actively to prevent the strengthening of the USSR's position and convince the Arabs to end the oil embargo [26]<sup>3</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> Although J. Kennedy rejected Israel's request for a major arms deal, he did approve the sale of Hawk missiles to Israel in return for supplying Soviet missiles to Egypt and Iraq. In the case of the US, the formation of a "sponsor-client" relationship would make the state of Israel more controllable, especially considering Israel's experience of bypassing the US and dealing with Great Britain and France during the Suez crisis.

<sup>2</sup> Despite a commitment not to sell offensive weapons to both the Arabs and Israel, the United States nevertheless directly and indirectly supported Israel from 1961 to 1967 in acquiring both American "defensive weapons" and arms from France, Germany, and Great Britain. The reasons for this were the continuous strengthening of the USSR in the Middle Eastern region, which was clearly demonstrated by the agreement to sell arms to Egypt worth about 500 million, reached in June 1963.

<sup>3</sup> The indirect US support for Israel in the Six Day War led to resentment among Arab states, culminating in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. At that time, Arab countries imposed an oil embargo against countries that supported the US and Israel, and the price of oil on the world market rose from \$3 to \$12 per barrel. This caused economic

As early as 1973, discussions on the Palestine issue became more intensified in the United Nations. In November 1974, during Gerald Ford's presidency, the UN General Assembly recognized the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, sovereignty, and national independence, allowing the Palestine Liberation Organization to become a UN observer and act there as the "sole and legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. However, the United States as a sign of its support for Israel, together with the latter, voted against this resolution [5 p. 89]. However, on the other hand, acting as a mediator between Israel and Egypt after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and trying to bring the Israelis to a common denominator by making concessions, under the name of "reassessment" [17] of US foreign policy in the Middle East (1975 March-September) G. Ford 6 months in a row refused Israel's requests for economic and military assistance of about 2.6 billion dollars and resumed the provision of financial assistance after the signing of the Second (Interim) Sinai Agreement between Egypt and Israel on September 4, 1975, in Geneva [30].

Building on the afore-mention, Presidents L. Johnson, R. Nixon and G. Ford showed little interest in democracy "promotion". Overall, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnam War and the spreading "threat of communism" as factors froze democracy promotion as a foreign policy direction and instrument of implementation. [12, p. 239].

Under Richard Nixon, Iran was the second largest US arms importer in the region following Israel, and due to its relations with Israel, enjoyed the support of the Jewish lobby representatives in Congress. R. Nixon and Jimmy Carter considered the Shah of Iran to be accordingly "policeman of the Gulf" and "pillar of stability" [5, pp. 80-81]. However, after the Islamic revolution, relations with Iran worsened. In this context, in the late 1970s, J. Carter reformulated democracy as a foreign policy principle, presenting its promotion as part of the agenda for the protection of human rights, combining it with the creation of preventive measures through the possible use of force, essentially continuing D. Eisenhower's political legacy. Since J. Carter, the policies of all US presidents in the region have been aimed at preventing the export of the Islamic revolution as a threat to US regional interests. After the Islamic Revolution, under J. Carter's presidency, Rapid Deployment Force was even created to prevent the possible Iranian threat to the Gulf states. In addition to this, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after the overthrow of the Shah, doubled the threats to US regional interests, therefore, J. Carter declared the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia the US third security zone [2].

Ronald Reagan's "tough containment" doctrine emphasized the importance of spreading liberal democracy and expanding the free market economy to counter the advance of communism [32, p.4]. The institutionalization of democracy support ranged from indirect methods of "exporting" democracy to direct assistance to political parties and civil society abroad to establish democratic systems and generally aimed at isolating the USSR. This was justified by the fact, that in the new stage of the development of capitalism, in the conditions of the developing globalization and the promotion of production and financial transnational capital, a greater number of representatives of the political and economic elites would be in favor of opening their countries to free trade and transnational corporate investments [Ibid].

However, in the case of the Middle East, J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt explain the sale of biological agents to Iraq (warheads, which were used against the Iranian army and the Kurdish minority in Iraq) by Reagan's administration neither by the spread of liberal democracy nor by the expansion of the free market economy, yet by weakening Iran and geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of the US. Moreover, the former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, being Ronald Reagan's special envoy

---

stagnation and decline in the United States and Europe from 1973 to 1975, a recession with rising prices and unemployment.

for the Middle East, was one of the key players in deepening ties with Iraq and was sent to Iraq in 1983 to improve and strengthen relations with the latter [19,p. 56]. A year after Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds in 1989, the National Security Strategic Directive signed by George H. W. Bush (Sr.) affirmed that a normal U.S.-Iraqi relationship would serve long-term mutual interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East regions [22; 5, pp. 111-112].

At that time, the US administration, taking advantage of the crisis in the USSR, based on the need to find alternative ways of obtaining hydrocarbon resources in the region, as well as the need to find allies in the region against Iran, did not notice the Saddam Hussein's genocidal policy against the Kurds [18, p. 38], but 14 years later, during the preparations for the Iraqi campaign in 2002-2003, the issue "revived" [19, p. 55].

The mentioned directive, adopted after the Iran-Iraq war, already mentioned the possibility of applying a wide range of economic and political sanctions against any possible illegal use of chemical and or biological weapons, while combining this with the imperative to protect human rights in Iraq [Ibid]. It can be concluded that as early as 1989, the agenda of combating the proliferation of WMD and protecting human rights was already being put forward as a tool for possible deterrence of Iraq in the future.

The post-Cold War "democracy promotion", as a regional policy tool under Bush Sr., was to help fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the socialist camp and strengthen the core principles of US foreign policy in the emerging world order. In 1994, in his annual address before the Joint Session of the US Congress, B. Clinton presented democracy and the protection of human rights as the third strategic pillar of the USA, along with security and economic progress. [1]. In the 1990s, academic debates on the theme that democratic states do not go to war against each other gained momentum (this had also been expressed in the above-mentioned presidential address [Ibid]).

Despite their declared support for democratic values, not a single senior member of the Bill Clinton administration ever "uttered a public word about Middle East democracy" [6, p. 8]. However, when it comes to the American policy towards Iraq as the main target of the implementation of the "containment and engagement" doctrine, the "introduction" of democracy was marked by the adoption of the "Iraq Liberation" Act in 1998. As per the Act, the establishment of democracy in Iraq was declared as the main goal accompanied by the imperative of overthrowing Saddam Hussein [15].

#### ***Perceptions of "democracy promotion" after 9***

In the national security strategy documents circulated under Bush Jr., in addition to describing the comprehensive fight against terrorism and the tools for strengthening the positions of the United States, great importance was given to democracy promotion. Democracy promotion was already one of the main provisions proposed in the National Security Strategy of September 20, 2002. The aim was to promote democracy and human rights around the world, particularly in Muslim countries. According to the document, the US sought not to impose democracy, but to contribute to the creation of such conditions, thanks to which people would be able to claim the right to a free future [36, c. 278]. The promotion of freedoms and democratic values would contribute to the fight against international terrorism and the elimination of the threat of terrorism and the conditions for the emergence of terrorism [24].

Developing the above idea in his 2002 State of the Union address to Congress [28], as well as in his West Point speech, Bush emphasized the importance of spreading democratic values in Muslim countries, since, according to him, the inhabitants of the latter were entitled to the same freedoms and opportunities that were available to citizens of many other countries around the world [27]. Bush then announced at the National Endowment for a Democracy in 2003 a "future strategy for freedom in the Middle East", while condemning previous US presidential administrations and Western governments

for "condescending and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East". Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's 2005 speech in Cairo, in which she "accused" previous administrations of "prioritizing regional stability over democracy," carried similar emphasis [9]. Later, the president's administration called this "strategy" the "Freedom Agenda", which became the key concept of regional politics after the second inauguration of the president [6, p.6].

As noted by A. Davidov, the peculiarity of Bush Jr.'s foreign policy was that democracy was also presented as a means of the "war against terrorism", thus, the establishment of democratic institutions was primarily intended to tackle the ideology of the formation of terrorist groups [35, c. 52-53; 23]<sup>4</sup>. Both the aforementioned and the claim that, according to the Bush administration, promoting democracy in the region would prevent ethnic and religious conflicts were controversial. By promoting national and "liberation" movements aimed at overthrowing authoritarian regimes, the task was to contribute to the establishment of democratic institutions as a result. In the American perception, democratization was considered an effective means of combating terrorist groups and their supporting regimes or the "war on terror".

In the context of the study of the "democracy promotion" policy, it should be noted that the basis of the Bush doctrine, in addition to the neoconservatives, was also the "domino theory", which has been relevant since the time of D. Eisenhower. The domino theory was a cornerstone of American foreign policy during the Cold War. It was the consequence of the anti-communist ideology and explained the phenomenon and the possibility of the "threat" of Southeast Asian countries' successive domino-like falling under the USSR's sphere of influence, following the example of Vietnam. In his speeches, Eisenhower stated that the United States should adopt a tougher and more active approach in the fight against communism, which also meant the possibility of interfering with other countries' internal affairs even without a clear threat from their side [35, p. 66-68]<sup>5</sup>.

Time, however, showed the irrational nature of the "domino theory", particularly in the case of the US Middle East policy. The point is that this theory was logically well connected at the theoretical level, but, in practice, forming the basis of the American model of democratization of the regions, it did not work. This fact could be explained by the fact that during the Cold War, based on the logic of the bipolar world order, US regional policy was based on simple cause-and-effect analyses and calculations rather than on a solid and deep study of the features of the international situation. [Ibid]. More precisely, it can be said that the "domino theory" worked, but in the opposite direction, in the sense that, as a result of the implementation of the Bush doctrine in Iraq, the anti-American sentiments that quickly took root in a "domino way" led many representatives of the Sunni minority, both from the general population, from the disbanded Iraqi armed forces, and from the ranks of the Baath Party, to join the Iraqi al-Qaeda. If we look at the later emergence of the Islamic State, it can be considered a response to the American policy of the war on terror and democracy promotion.

Foreign military occupation and attempts to spread democracy radicalized the local population. In Fallujah, which later became an ISIS stronghold, in April 2003, US troops opened fire on a crowd of peaceful protesters, killing and wounding dozens of Iraqis. The ensuing violence and chaos

---

<sup>4</sup> The protection of human rights and the condemnation of violations, as well as the improvement of the quality of work of state institutions, were chosen as a key direction for the establishment of democracy. This would be accompanied by continuous improvement of the socio-economic and educational level of the population.

<sup>5</sup> Eisenhower's April 7, 1954 speech against the Communist threat marked the emergence of the domino theory as one of the most important concepts in US foreign policy for more than 50 years. The speech specifically referred to the communist takeover of Vietnam, which could have the effect of falling dominoes and lead to the repetition of similar scenarios in neighboring countries.

led to a significant number of Iraqi Sunnis turning to radical groups, the most prominent of which was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which later emerged as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) [14]. In the context of "democracy promotion", disbanding the rather well-trained Iraqi army of about half a million people was also not sensible from a security point of view. This drove the mostly Sunni army officers, as well as many members of the Ba'ath Party, who were marginalized by the newly formed Shia-Kurdish government, to terrorist groups [8; 10]<sup>6</sup>.

The third reason for anti-American sentiments and violence was at least the fact that the US army detained tens of thousands of Iraqis, many of whom had not participated in any operations, in the south of Iraq, in the Bukqa camp, where many of them were recruited by the exiled jihadists joining later their groups. As stated by James Skylar Gerrond, the commander of the American military unit in Camp Bucca, Many American officers were concerned that Bucca had turned from a detention camp into a "hot pot" for extremism. By the way, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL, the self-proclaimed caliph, who "absorbed the jihadist ideology while still in Bucca and became one of the authorities there" was also one of the former detainees of Bucca [3; 11; 25].

### ***Transformational diplomacy***

If the first period of Bush Jr.'s presidency was the period of "hard power", then in the second period, the latter tried to introduce American democracy on a larger scale with the strategy of "soft power". The second term of Bush Jr.'s presidency can be characterized as a period of "correcting mistakes and errors". During the second presidency of Bush Jr., the concept of "introduction and spread of democracy" received new content with the formulation of Condoleezza Rice, with the introduction of "transformational diplomacy". According to Condoleezza Rice's speech at Georgetown University on January 18, 2006, it was supposed to adopt diplomacy that would change the world while acting in the current situation, based on the considerations of "putting an end to dictatorship in the world and promoting democracy and democratic institutions in all countries" [33]. The goal was to make the American diplomacy priorities in all regions more concrete and redeploy and increase the number of personnel for more effective new foreign policy priorities. Active cooperation with Congress on the global strategic directions of the United States was emphasized. Regional and transnational cooperation was emphasized as a way to "overcome" the ideas that fuel terrorism.

One of the goals of transformative diplomacy was to expand the network of diplomatic presence in regions where the US cannot actually and legally have diplomatic or consular representation to influence domestic "reforms" in those states. An American diplomat was merely moving out of a diplomatic mission to live and work in a transitional society, acting as an American Presence Post [Ibid].<sup>7</sup>

According to A. Davydov, the "transformational diplomacy" revised the provision of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the concept of "national independence". The target of this diplomacy was not the interstate, but intrastate issues, because, according to A. Davydov, at the current stage, the source of the main threats to American interests should be sought within countries, and not between countries [34, p. 51] <sup>8</sup>. That concept of foreign policy justified the

---

<sup>6</sup> For example, one of the Iraqis closest to al-Baghdadi was Ibrahim Izzat al-Duri, who was a high-ranking official in Saddam's government until 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Close cooperation with the Department of Defense was also emphasized in order to share the burden of the post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization work (such as in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and partially in Afghanistan and Iraq).

<sup>8</sup> Due to this, the task was to change the nature of work of diplomatic agencies abroad. In practice, the US increased the number of diplomatic missions in India, China, Nigeria, etc. and reduced the number in Europe.



interference with the internal affairs of sovereign countries and military methods of overthrowing the authorities based on the agenda of the fight against terrorism and democracy.

Within the framework of "transformational diplomacy," it is necessary to mention the "New Strategy in Iraq" presented by Bush to Congress on January 10, 2007 (also known as "New Way Forward" [16] or "Surge") aiming at solving security issues. Bush pointed out the US's two mistakes in the escalation of violence in Iraq - not having enough troops in Iraq and limiting the actions of the troops already there. He was promoting a new strategy, which implied sending additional 21,500 troops to Iraq [29; 37]. It was no secret that before that, additional US troops were regularly being sent to Iraq. This action was justified by the need to hold national elections, or by the aggravation of the situation in that country. The deployment of such a large number of troops was planned for quite a long time. However, if before the US troops left the areas cleared of militants, the "Surge" envisaged that they should stay there for a long time to maintain security [Ibid].

**CONCLUSION:** Summing up the peculiarities of the Bush administration's policy of democracy promotion, we can conclude that according to the American political-ideological circles, it would work according to the domino principle, therefore, its origins in essence and content were deriving from the logic of the Cold War bipolar world order.

Although democracy promotion had never been considered the end goal, and had rather been manifested as a regional policy tool (after failing the war on terror) due to the "transformational diplomacy" that came to remedy the situation through the creation of a more extensive network of American representation, the use of soft power, i.e. promotion of democracy, became a pivotal pillar of regional policy. Besides the bilateral and multilateral relations, internal political life became the subject matter of American diplomacy. This was another manifestation of the neoconservative ideology laying under the Bush doctrine - the interference with the internal life of other countries, or more precisely, this was the modern manifestation of D. Eisenhower's anti-communism toolkit of soft power.

Summarizing the above-mentioned points, it can be concluded that domino theory and transformational diplomacy that were in the arsenal of the Bush doctrine were the basis for the manifestations of extremism in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, at the same time enabled the Bush administration and its successors to ensure a continued US presence in the region thanks to an instigated Islamist terrorism.

### Bibliography

1. *Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union*, Washington, January 25, 1994, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-theunio12> [date.20.04.2022].
2. *Address by President Carter on the State of the Union Before a Joint Session of Congress*, Washington, January 23, 1980, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I // Foundations of Foreign Policy, Historical Documents*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d138>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
3. Bandow D., *The Collapse of Iraq and the Rise of ISIS: Made in America?* The Cato Institute, September 23, 2015, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/collapse-iraq-rise-isis-made-america>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
4. Bar-Siman-Tov Y., *"The United States and Israel since 1948: A 'Special Relationship'?"* // *Diplomatic History*, vol. 22, no. 2, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 231-262, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913659>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
5. Bin-Odah A. M., *U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Bush war on terror: elite opinion and the failure of U.S. strategy*, PhD thesis, University of Sheffield., October 2006, 164 p. [https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4216/1/434613\\_vol1.pdf](https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4216/1/434613_vol1.pdf), [date acces. 20.04.2022].

6. Bruce G. *Did Bush Democratize the Middle East? The Effects of External–Internal Linkages.* // Political Scienc Quarterly, December 2013, pp. 1-33, DOI:10.1002/polq.12141,[date accessed: 20.04.2022].
7. Carney C.P. *International patron-client relationships: A conceptual framework* // Studies in Comparative International Development 24, 42–55, 1989, pp. 42–55, <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687171>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
8. Coles Is. and Parker N., *The Baathists: how Saddam’s men help Islamic State rule*, The Reuters, Dec. 11, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
9. Condoleezza R., “*Remarks at the American University in Cairo.*” U.S. Department of State, 20 June 2005,<http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
10. Filkins D. *Did George W. Bush Create ISIS?*, May 15, 2015, The New Yorker, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/did-george-w-bush-create-isis>, [date accessed:20.04.2022]
11. Former US military adviser David Kilcullen says there would be no Isis without Iraq invasion. David Kilcullen advised General David Petraeus on countering the Iraq insurgency, The Independent, 04 March 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-war-invasion-caused-isis-islamic-state-daesh-saysus-military-adviser-david-kilcullen-a6912236.html>, [date accessed: 06.01.2023].
12. Fowler M. W. *A Brief Survey of Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy.*// Democracy and Security, 11:3, 2015, pp. 227-247, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2015.1045974>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
13. Hall A. *Patron-client relations* // The Journal of Peasant Studies, 1:4, 1974, pp. 506-509, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066157408437908>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022]
14. Hasan M. *Sayedahmed D., Blowback: how ISIS was created by the U.S. invasion of Iraq*, The Intercept, January 29, 2018, <https://theintercept.com/2018/01/29/isis-iraq-war-islamic-state-blowback/>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
15. Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 - *Declares that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government, H.R.4655 — 105th Congress (1997-1998)*, The Congress, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/house-bill/4655>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
16. Johnson D. “*2007 in Iraq: The Surge and Benchmarks - A New Way Forward?*” // American University International Law Review, no. 2 (2008), pp. 249-573, <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=auilr>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
17. *Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin*, Negotiations and Reassessment, June 1974– June 1975, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 156, Washington, 2011, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d156>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
18. Mahdi A. *US Foreign Policy and Energy Resources During the George W. Bush Administration, A thesis submitted to TheUniversity of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*, School of Historical Studies University of Birmingham, January 2010, 504p., <https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/748/1/Mahdi10PhD.pdf>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
19. Mearsheimer J. J. and Walt S. M. “*An Unnecessary War*”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 134, Washington post. Newsweek Interactive, LLC, 2003, pp. 50-59, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3183521>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
20. *Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower*, Washington, March 1, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954 //

- Historical Documents, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d169>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
21. Memorandum of conversation, “Conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Meir,” 27 December 1962, *National Security Archive*, 9 p., <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/5983537/National-Security-Archive-Doc-02-Memorandum-of.pdf>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
  22. *National Security Directive 26 on U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf*, 2 October, 1989 // The George Bush Presidential Library and Museum administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 3 p., <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd26.pdf>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
  23. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, <https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>, [date accessed: 30.03.2023].
  24. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>, [date accessed: 30.03.2023].
  25. *No ISIS if we didn't invade Iraq: David Kilcullen interview*, Channel 4 News, Mar 2, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkncP8gkXPg>, [date accessed: 06.01.2023].
  26. *Oil Embargo, 1973–1974, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
  27. *President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point*, Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
  28. President Delivers State of the Union Address, The White House, January 29, 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>, [date accessed: 30.03.2023].
  29. *President's Address to the Nation*, Office of the Press Secretary, January 10, 2007, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html>, [date accessed: 30.03.2023].
  30. Quandt W. B. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967*, Appendix C: Letter from President hFord to Prime Minister Rabin September 1, 1975, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Appendix-C.pdf>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
  31. Risen J. *The C.I.A. in Iran* // *Secrets of History*, The New York Times, 2000, <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-intro.html>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
  32. Rodrigues Mateo L. *The changing nature and architecture of U.S. democracy assistance*, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 63(1): e010, 2020, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202000110>, pp. 1-19, [date accessed: 20.04.2022]
  33. *Transformational Diplomacy*, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, January 18, 2006, The US Department of State Archive, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022].
  34. Давыдов А. А. «Продвижение демократии» во внешней политике США в начале XXI века, Диссертация на соискание ученой степени кандидата политических наук, Специальность: 23.00.04 - Политические проблемы международных отношений, глобального и регионального развития, Федеральное государственное бюджетное НИИМЭМО имени Е. Примакова РАН, Москва – 2019, 199 с., <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/dis/2019-001-Davydov-DIS.pdf>, [дата обращения: 02.04.2022] (in Russian)
  35. Зобнин А. *Теория домино в научном дискурсе* // *Международные процессы*, Том 14, № 2, 2016., сс. 65-77, <http://intertrends.ru/system/Doc/ArticlePdf/1582/hJRGg5nHOM.pdf>, [дата обращения: 20.04.2022]. (in Russian)

36. Колобов О., Тумина Ю. *Доктринальные основы внешней политики США при администрациях Дж. Буша-мл. и Б. Обамы* // Вестник Нижегородского университета им. Н.И. Лобачевского, 2012, № 1 (1), сс. 277–284, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/doktrinalnye-osnovy-vneshney-politiki-ssha-pri-administratsiyah-dzh-busha-ml-i-b-obamy/viewer>, [дата обращения: 20.04.2022]. (in Russian)
37. Мартиросян С. *Борьба за Ближний Восток продолжается: Новая стратегия США*, // Фонд Нораванк, 01.02.2007, [http://noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT\\_ID=2852](http://noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=2852), [date accessed: 20.04.2022]. (in Armenian)

### References

1. (34) Davydov A. A., "Promotion of Democracy" in US Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century, Dissertation for the degree of candidate of political sciences, Specialty: 23.00.04 – Political problems «*Prodvizheniye demokratii*» vo vneshney politike SSHA v nachale XXI veka, Moscow - 2019, 199 p., <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/dis/2019-001-Davydov-DIS.pdf>, [date accessed 02.04.2022]. (in Russian)
2. (35) Zobnin A., Domino theory in scientific discourse // International processes, Vol. 14, No. 2, [*Teoriya domino v nauchnom diskurse* // Mezhdunarodnyye protsessy, Tom 14, № 2], 2016., pp. 65-77, <http://intertrends.ru/system/Doc/ArticlePdf/1582/hJRG5nHOM.pdf>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022]. (in Russian)
3. (36) Tumina Yu. Doctrinal foundations of US foreign policy under the administrations of George W. Bush Jr. and B. Obama // Bulletin of the Nizhny Novgorod University. N.I. Lobachevsky, 2012, No. 1 [*Doktrinal'nyye osnovy vneshney politiki SSHA pri administratsiyakh Dzh. Busha ml. i B. Obamy* ,] pp. 277– 284, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/doktrinalnye-osnovy-vneshney-politiki-ssha-pri-administratsiyah-dzh-busha-ml-i-b-obamy/viewer>, [date accessed: 20.04.2022]. (in Russian)
4. (37) Martirosyan S., The struggle for the Middle East continues: New US Strategy, Noravank Foundation [*Bor'ba za Blizhniy Vostok prodolzhayetsya: Novaya strategiya SSHA*, // Fond Noravank], [http://noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT\\_ID=2852](http://noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=2852), [date accessed: 20.04.2022]. (in Russian)

Շնորհակալ էլ / Принята / Received on: 02.04.2023

Գրախոսակ էլ / Рецензирована / Reviewed on: 24.04.2023

Հանձնակ էլ սույ. / Сдана в пч. / Accepted for Pub: 10. 06.2023

### Information about the author

**Astghik Sergo HAYRAPETYAN:** Specialist at the Deputy Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister's Staff, Yerevan, RA,  
e-mail: [astghhayrapetyan@gmail.com](mailto:astghhayrapetyan@gmail.com). <https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3250-5756>

**Աստղիկ Սերգոյի ՀԱՅՐԱՊԵՏՅԱՆ`** ՀՀ վարչապետի աշխատակազմի փոխվարչապետի գրասենյակի մասնագետ, Երևան, ՀՀ,  
էլ. հասցե՝ [astghhayrapetyan@gmail.com](mailto:astghhayrapetyan@gmail.com). <https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3250-5756>

**Астхик Сергеевна АЙРАПЕТЯН:** Специалист офиса Вице-премьера аппарата Премьер-министра, Ереван, РА,  
эл. адрес: [astghhayrapetyan@gmail.com](mailto:astghhayrapetyan@gmail.com). <https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3250-5756>